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I. INTRODUCTION

Within the last ten years, many financial firms, including units
belonging to General Motors, Ford, Honda, and J.P. Morgan Chase, have
stopped leasing cars in the state of New York because of its unlimited
vicarious liability law which allows injured car accident victims to collect
unlimited damages from the owners of leased or rented cars.' Most states
do not have this kind of vicarious liability law, but legislatures in those few
that do have been subjected to intense lobbying by car dealer groups 2 that

want to eliminate vicarious liability and trial lawyers who want to keep the
status quo.3 Car dealer lobbyists were not successful in New York, but they
were successful in Congress.4
In 2005, Congress passed, and the President signed, a multi-billion
dollar transportation act that contained the Graves Amendment, which
prohibits any state from holding those in the business of renting or leasing
cars liable for injuries caused by those cars, absent any negligence on their
part.5 If Congress has the authority to enact this law, it arises from its
Commerce Clause power.6 Although several "Graves Amendment" cases
in several states have been litigated, only one lower court in New York has
1. See Adam Rombel, Auto DealersAdjust to Life with LighterLeasing Load,CENT. N.Y.
Bus. J., Dec. 19, 2003, at 3, availableat www.findarticles.com/p/articles/miqa3718/is_200312/
ai n9312408.
2. See, e.g., Press Release, Truck Renting and Leasing Association, House Approves
National Repeal of Vicarious Liability-TRALA Leads Alliance to Victory (July 29, 2005),
www.trala.org/news/pressreleases/release-07-29-2005.php; NY's Vicarious Liability Costly for
Consumers and Auto Dealers, INS. J., July 19, 2004, available at www.insurancejoumal.com/
magazines/east/2004/07/19/features/44590.htm.
3. See, e.g., John Caher, FederalLaw Held to Subvert State PolicePower,N.Y. L.J., Sept.
21,2006, at 1 (noting that the New York State Trial Lawyers Association had successfully blocked
state legislation to eliminate vicarious liability), availableat www.trala.org/docs/industryCouncil/
Vicarious LiabilityFor Lessors.pdf; The Motor VehicleRentalFairnessAct:Hearingson S. 1130
Before the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation, 106th Cong. (1999)
(statement by Larry S. Stewart, former president of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America).
4. Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users,
Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified in U.S. Code in various sections of titles 16,
18, 21, 23, 26, 42, 49).
5. Id.
6. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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asserted the unconstitutionality of the federal statutory provision.7 As a
practical matter, this one decision is of very limited significance, but it
raises a broad and important issue about the authority of congress to
preempt areas of state law that have long been considered particularly
appropriate for state regulation within the states' general police power.
This Article first discusses the history and background of statutes
imposing vicarious liability on car owners, including past and present
statutory and common law state arrangements. Then, there is a description
of the Graves Amendment and a brief history of its enactment, followed by
a review of the relevant cases. Next, the Article reviews recent U.S.
Supreme Court jurisprudence concerning the Commerce Clause and
federalism which leads to a discussion of how the codified Graves
Amendment holds up under constitutional scrutiny. The Article concludes
that an argument can be made that Congress exceeded its authority in
enacting the Graves Amendment; nevertheless, it is more likely than not
that the current Supreme Court would uphold the legislation. States can,
however, pass new legislation that would not be preempted by the Graves
Amendment and that would provide protection to car accident victims
similar to that provided by their vicarious liability statutes.
In this Article, "Graves Amendment" is used to refer to the legislative
provision before enactment and "section 30106" refers to the provision
after codification. Although states have many laws that distinguish among
different types of motor vehicles, the distinctions are not relevant for this
discussion and different terms are used (motor vehicle, car, truck) only for
simplification and to accurately reflect wording of state statutes. There are
also differences in laws for renting cars and leasing cars, but the Graves
Amendment applies to both, so this Article makes no such distinctions.
II. VICARIOUS LIABILITY OF CAR OWNERS AND LESSORS

A. History and Background
Generally at common law, the owner of a motor vehicle is not liable for
injuries caused by the negligence of another person driving the vehicle
(i.e., vicariously liable) unless the driver was acting as an employee or
agent of the owner.8 Both English and U.S. common law have traditionally
relied on a tort system based on fault, although English justices were

7. See infra text accompanying notes 87-94.
8. See, e.g., Morris v. Snappy Car Rental, Inc., 84 N.Y. 2d 21, 27 (1994).
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developing a vicarious liability theory as early as 1700. 9 In 1829, the
Supreme Court of Judicature in New York noted that if an "accident
happen[ed] entirely without the fault of the defendant, or any blame being
imputable to him, an action will not lie."' The same court reiterated that
principle in 1843," and a lower New York appellate court cited it in
1893.2

In 1924, the New York Legislature overturned this common law
principle and imposed liability on the owner of a vehicle for the negligence
of a driver of the vehicle who was operating it with the permission of the
owner.' 3 In 1929,14 the legislature reenacted the law and amended it over
the years, maintaining its existence to the present, 5 in spite of attempts to
repeal it.' 6 The statute created owner liability so that innocent victims of
negligence could receive compensation for their injuries from "a
financially responsible insured person."' 7 In other words, the statute was
developed to take advantage of the "deep pockets" of the insured car
owner. Commentators were discussing "vicarious liability" as a "'deep
pockets' practice" as far back as 1916,18 and the practice influenced tort
law through the early 1980s.' 9 Clearly, when the New York law and other
similar statutes 20 were enacted, legislators were not considering the liability

9. Gary T. Schwartz, The Hidden and FundamentalIssue of VicariousLiability, 69 S. CAL.
L. REv. 1739, 1746 (1996) (citing Boson v. Sandford, 87 Eng. Rep. 212 (1689); Hem v. Nichols,
91 Eng. Rep. 256 (1709); Lane v. Cotton, 88 Eng. Rep. 853 (1701); Jones v. Hart, 91 Eng. Rep.
382 (1698); Turberville v. Stampe, 91 Eng. Rep. 1072 (1697)); see also George N. Meros, Jr. &
Chanta G. Hendley, Florida'sTort Reform Act: Keeping Faith with the Promise of Hoffman v.
Jones, 27 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 461,461-62 (2000).
10. Bullock v. Babcock, 3 Wend. 391 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1829).
11. Harvey v. Dunlop, Hill & Den. 193 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1843).
12. Laidlaw v. Sage, 25 N.Y.S. 955, 958 (N.Y. Gen. Term 1893).
13. Highway Law of 1909, N.Y. HIGH. LAW § 282-e (1924).
14. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 59 (1929).
15. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388 (2002).
16. S.B. 2477,2003-2004 Gen. Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); A.B. 1042,2003-2004 Gen.
Assem., Reg. Sess. (N.Y. 2003); see also Thomas B. Hudson & Daniel J. Laudicina, Recent
Developments in Motor Vehicle Leasing and Litigation, 59 Bus. LAW. 1145, 1147 (2004).
17. Hassan v. Montuori, 99 N.Y.2d 348, 353 (2003); Morris v. Snappy Car Rental, 84
N.Y.2d 21, 27 (1994); Plath v. Justus, 28 N.Y. 2d 16, 20 (1971).
18. See, e.g., Schwartz, supranote 9, at 1744 (citing THOMAS BATY, VICARIOUS LIABILITY
146-54 (1916)).
19. Id.
20. See Kenneth J. Rojc & Kathleen E. Stendahl, Vicarious Liability of Motor Vehicle
Lessors, 59 Bus. LAW. 1161, 1166 (2004) (noting that in the past Connecticut and Rhode Island
also imposed vicarious liability on car owners)..
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of car lessors; they were envisioning an uninsured pedestrian hit by a hired
driver with no resources."1
General acceptance of basing tort law on "deep pockets" practices
began to wane in the 1980s, and courts and legislatures returned to
emphasizing fault once again in a so-called "tort reform" effort.22 For
example, in 1993 the Florida Supreme Court noted that the most equitable
result in tort law equates liability with fault,23 and in 1997, the Florida
legislature limited the financial liability of car owners and lessors for the
negligence of permitted drivers.24 In 2002, reflecting a widespread
movement in the law favoring defendants, Professor James Henderson
argued that negligence, rather than strict liability theories, is "the dominant
principle of American tort" law because it is fair to "let the wrongdoer
pay. 2 5 Unlike the New York legislators of the early twentieth century,
Professor Henderson asserted that it is the victims of negligence who
should insure against their injuries because they control the losses.2 6
B. State Statutes
Without federal preemption, New York, Rhode Island, and Maine are
currently the only states to impose unlimited vicarious liability on car
owners (including lessors) for the negligence of drivers (including
lessees).27 The New York statute holds
[e]very owner of a vehicle used or operated in [New York] ...
liable and responsible for death or injuries to person or property
resulting from negligence in the use or operation of such vehicle, in
the business of such owner or otherwise, by any person using or

21. Id. at 1162.
22. See, e.g., Meros & Hendley, supra note 9, at 483-85.
23. Hoffman v. Jones, 280 So. 2d 431, 438 (Fla. 1993).
24. FLA. STAT. ch. 324.021(9) (1997) (placing dollar implications on the lessor/owner for the
negligence of a lessee and a "permission" user); see also Meros & Hendley, supra note 9, at 48485.
25. James A. Henderson, Jr., Why Negligence Dominates Tort, 50 UCLA L. REv. 377, 405
(2002).
26. Id.
27. There are many issues involving definitions of "owners," "renters," "lessors," "motor
vehicles," and other terms relevant to a discussion of vicarious liability in state law, but they are
beyond the scope of this Article, which seeks to give a general overview of state law in order to
understand the implications of the Graves Amendment and whether it is constitutional. For a
discussion of specific disputes in the area of vehicle leasing, see Hudson & Laudicina, supra note
16. This Article will not make distinctions between leasing and renting, nor between passenger
vehicles and other motor vehicles.
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operating
the same with the permission, express or implied, of such
28
owner.
The Rhode Island statute provides that any car owner/lessor "shall be
jointly and severally liable with any person operating the vehicle for any
damages caused by the negligence of any person operating the vehicle...
with the permission of the owner., 29 The Maine statute says that "[a]n
owner engaged in the business of renting motor vehicles... is jointly and
severally liable with the renter for damage caused by the negligence of the
renter in operating the vehicle."3 ° Although, the Kentucky statute seems to
impose vicarious liability upon car owners,3' the Kentucky Department of
Insurance has indicated that it considers a car lessee to be the owner of the
car to the exclusion of the lessor.3"
Until 2003, Connecticut also had an unlimited vicarious liability
statute 33 dating back to the 1797 Act to Regulate Stage and Other Carriage
Drivers. 34 The Connecticut Supreme Court concluded that the statute's
purpose was to "protect[] the public from unsafe drivers," and that "the
legislature [was] free to conclude that costs associated with rentals to
unsafe drivers should be borne by the enterprise that affords such drivers
access to the highways, without requiring the injured party to show the
negligeoce of the enterprise itself."35 In 2003, the Connecticut Legislature
amended the statute limiting liability so that lessors would not be
vicariously liable if the lease of a private passenger car was for one year or
more, and the car was insured for bodily injury liability for at least
36
$100,000 per person and $300,000 per occurrence.
Several other states have similar "financial responsibility" statutory
schemes that limit the vicarious liability of car owners/lessors if they
28. N.Y. VEH. & TRAF. LAW § 388(1) (2002).
29. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-4 (a) (2006) (became effective June 2, 2006). For three years
prior to June 2,2006, Rhode Island limited the vicarious liability of car owners/lessors to $500,000,
but that statute had a sunset provision and terminated on June 2, 2006. The statute has not been
renewed thus far. R.I. GEN. LAWS § 31-34-4(b), (i) (2003).
30. ME. REV. STAT. ANN.tit. 29-A, § 1652(1) (2006).
31. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 304.39-010, 304.39-020(12) (West 2006) (giving the purpose
and policy of the Motor Vehicle Reparations Act and defining "owner" as a person with title to a
motor vehicle but not including lessees).
32. Rojc & Stendahl, supranote 20, at 1162 n. 11 (citing a letter from a staff attorney at the
Kentucky Department of Insurance).
33. Rojc & Stendahl, supra note 20, at 1166.
34. Cesar A. Noble, Connecticut Rental CarLiability Survey and Commentary, 74 CoNN.
B.J. 313, 313 (2000) (citing CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-154a).
35. Gionfriddo v. Avis Rent A Car Syst., Inc., 472 A.2d 306, 310 (Conn. 1984).
36. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 14-154a(b)(1) (2006).
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maintain a specific required amount of insurance. In California, the
vicarious liability of the car owner/lessor in one accident is limited to
$15,000 for the death or injury of one person, $30,000 for the death or
injury of more than one person, and $5,000 for property damage. 37 The
relevant Arizona statute specifically declares that the car owner/lessor "[i] s
not an insurer" and will be jointly and severally liable for damage caused
by a driver's negligence only if the owner/lessor does not maintain the
statutorily required liability insurance of$15,000 for one rental vehicle and
$10,000 for each additional vehicle up to a maximum of $100,000 for any
number of vehicles.38
Delaware's statutory scheme requires insurance amounts of$ 10,000 for
injury to one person, $20,000 for more than one, and $5,000 for property
damage in any one accident.39 Other states and territories with "financial
responsibility" statutes that relieve owners/lessors of vicarious liability if
they maintain specified insurance minimums include Florida ($500,000
combined bodily injury and property damage),4" Oklahoma ($25,000 for
injury or death of one person, $50,000 for injury or death of two or more
people, $25,000 in property damage), 4 ' Wisconsin
($25,000/$50,000/$ 10,000),42 Guam ($5,000/$10,000/$5,000), 43 and Idaho
(($25,000/$50,000/$15,000). 44 Nebraska has a financial responsibility
statute for trucks (but not for cars) leased for less than thirty days or leased
for any amount of time for commercial purposes that makes truck lessors
jointly and severally liable for injuries caused by the truck's operator

37. CAL. VEH. CODE §§ 17150, 17151 (West 2006). An earlier version of the California
statute provided for unlimited vicarious liability. CAL. VEH. CODE § 402 (West 1937). The
California Supreme Court declared that the legislative purpose of that statute
was to protect innocent third parties from the careless use of automobiles and that
this protection should be paramount to the rights of an owner who has permitted
the use of his car by others even though he, personally, was not guilty of
negligence .... The legislation was plainly intended to enlarge the liability of the
nonculpable owner of a motor vehicle for its operation on a public highway
[because of] ... the permission given to another to use an instrumentality which
if improperly used is a danger and menace to the public.
Burgess v. Cahill, 158 P.2d 393, 394-95 (Cal. 1945).
38. ARiZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 28-2166 (2006).
39. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21, § 6101 (2006).
40.
41.
42.
43.

FLA. STAT. ANN. § 324.021(9) (West 2006).
OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 47, § 8-101 (West 2006).
WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 344.01(2)(d), 344.51(1m) (West 2005).
GUAM CODE ANN. tit. 16, § 17101 (2006).

44. IDAHO CODE ANN. §§ 49-117(18), 49-2417 (Michie 2006).
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insurance policy with coverage limits of at
unless the lessor has
45 a liability
least $1,000,000.

Some states specifically eliminate vicarious liability for owners/lessors.
For example, the Iowa statute declares that for liability purposes the owner
of a leased vehicle is the lessee, not the person to whom the certificate of
holds that a motor vehicle's
title has been issued.46 The Utah statute
'47 also
"owner.
its
is
"lessee in possession"
Some states make a distinction between long-term and short-term
lessors for the purpose of vicarious liability. In Michigan, the statute
specifies that a person in the leasing business is not liable for damages for
injuries caused by the operation of the vehicle, but if the lease is for thirty
days or less, the owner/lessor is liable for the injury or death of one person
up to $20,000 for one person and up to $40,000 for two or more people.48
In Nevada, the statute defines a long-term lessor as a person who has
leased a vehicle for more than thirty-one days, 49 and a short-term lessor as
a person who has leased a vehicle for thirty-one days or less.5° The Nevada
statute then provides joint and several liability only for the short-term
driver/lessee's negligence, but only if the short-term lessor has not
obtained the required insurance of $15,000 for one person's injury,
$30,000 for more than one person's injury, and $10,000 for property
damage.5 '
In the District of Columbia, a statute deems the driver of a car to be the
agent of the owner,52 but an "owner" is defined as a person who holds
either legal title or a lessee with an immediate right of possession and a
right of purchase upon the performance of the conditions in the lease
agreement.53 Thus, there is a distinction between short-term and long-term

45. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-21, 239 (2006).
46. IOWA CODE ANN. § 321.493 (West 2006).
47. UTAH CODE ANN. § 41-12a-103(8)(b) (West 2006).
48. MICH. COMP LAWS § 257.401 (2006).

49. NEV. REV. STAT. § 482.053(3) (2003).
50. Id. § 482.053(5).
51. Id.§ 482.305(1).
52. D.C. CODE ANN. § 50-1301.08 (2001).
53. Id.§ 50-1301.02(7). The Mississippi statute defines "owner" the same way, MISS. CODE
ANN. § 63-15-3(h) (2006), as do the Missouri statute, Mo. ANN. STAT. § 301.010(43) (West 2006),
and the North Carolina statute, N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-4.01(26) (2006). In Ohio, "[i]f a motor
vehicle is the subject of a lease with an immediate right of possession vested in the lessee, the lessee
is the owner." OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4509.01(3)(D) (West 2006). On the other hand, in
Pennsylvania, the term "owner" of a motor vehicle excludes lessees. 75 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §

102 (West 2006) (suggesting that owners/lessors could be held vicariously liable, although there
seems to be no instance of that happening in Pennsylvania).

20071
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lessors, with the latter not being vicariously liable.54 Similarly, in
Minnesota, the driver is deemed to be the agent of the car owner," but
someone 56
who has leased the car for more than thirty days is considered an
"owner," eliminating the long-term lessor's vicarious liability.
A Massachusetts statute declares that a registered owner of a motor
vehicle is legally responsible for the conduct of its driver who causes
injuries by being involved in an accident. An affirmative defense is
available to the car owner, however, to prove the absence of such
responsibility. 5'
C. Common Law
In some states without relevant statutes, courts have held car
owners/lessors vicariously liable for the negligence of the car's driver by
creating the rebuttable presumption that the driver is the agent or servant
of the owner. In Illinois, an appellate court noted the reasonableness of this
arrangement because it should be easy for an owner to prove that a driver
was not an agent or servant.58 Maryland has a similar arrangement; its
highest court has opined that if a car "is negligently operated, it is
presumed that the owner consented to the negligence. Therefore, in the
absence of proof that he abandoned the right of control, he is liable for any
damage resulting from the negligence of the driver."5 9 In New Jersey,
courts have held that:
there is a "rule of law that use of an automobile upon a public
highway by one who is not an owner raises a presumption of agency
between the operator and the owner."... To prevent the issue of
agency from reaching the jury, the owner must show by
uncontradicted testimony that no employer-employee or principal
relationship existed.6 °

54. Shannon-Huber v. Gen'l Elec. Capital Auto Lease, Inc., 676 A.2d 467,468 (D.C. 1996).
55. MINN. STAT. ANN. § 169.09 (subd. 5a) (2006).
56. Id. § 168.011 (subd. 5).
57. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 231, § 85A (2000).
58. Bell v. Reid, 454 N.E.2d 1117, 1119-20 (Ill. App. Ct. 1983); see also Howard v.
Amerson, 236 Il. App. 587, 594 (1925).
59. Powers v. State, 11 A.2d 909, 911 (Md. 1940); see also Slutter v. Homer, 223 A.2d 141,
145 (Md. 1966); Williams v. Wheeler, 249 A.2d 104, 109-10 (Md. 1969).
60. Hernandez v. Velez, 631 A.2d 590,592 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1993) (quoting Harvey
v. Craw, 264 A.2d 448, 451 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1970)).
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About twenty states have neither statutes nor common law that
definitively indicate whether or not a car's owner will be vicariously liable
for the driver's negligence. 6 ' What is clear is that states have taken a wide
variety of positions, or none at all, in deciding how to balance the interests
of people injured in car accidents caused by driver negligence and the
interests of the owners/lessors of those cars. A few, like New York, have
decided that providing economic recompense for innocent victims is
paramount. Others have decided that car lessees should not subsidize,
through higher rates, the victims of car accidents. Some have taken a
middle ground, limiting the vicarious liability of owners/lessors to some
amount of required insurance coverage, and those amounts vary greatly.
Thus, the states are acting as the federalist "laboratories," trying different
legal strategies to balance the interests of innocent accident victims and
innocent owners/lessors when "guilty" negligent drivers cannot pay for the
injuries that they caused.
III. THE GRAVES AMENDMENT
To car leasing companies, vicarious liability is an important issue
because of its economic ramifications. Car leasing companies have stopped
leasing in states where there is unlimited vicarious liability.62 Some car
dealerships have reported substantial customer losses.6 3 Others have
substituted balloon-note financing plans that are similar, as a practical
matter, to leases but which are actually sales, so the dealership is no longer
the owner as in a lease.' The balloon-note arrangement is generally more
expensive for consumers because they have to pay sales tax on the total
price of the car instead ofjust the cost of the total lease payments.65 Interest
on balloon-notes may also be higher than on leases. 66 Thus, the industry

61. These include Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Georgia, Hawaii, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, Texas,
Vermont, Virginia, Washington, West Virginia, and Wyoming.
62. See, e.g., Chrysler Financialto Cease Leasing in Rhode Island,AUTO NEWS, June 24,
2005 (noting that Chrysler Financial stopped leasing in New York in 2004 because of the state's
unlimited vicarious liability law and that it will do the same in Rhode Island if it allows its limited
vicarious liability legislation to lapse); Rombel, supra note 1, at 3 (noting that the financial
divisions offGeneral Motors, Ford, and Honda stopped leasing in New York because ofcosts related
to the vicarious liability law).
63. Rombel, supra note 1, at 3.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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viewed August 10, 2005, the day that President Bush signed the "highway
bill," as one of the most important dates in industry history.67
The Act, officially known as the Safe, Accountable, Flexible, Efficient
Transportation Equity Act: A Legacy for Users or SAFETEA-LU, is a
highway funding measure that included billions of dollars for
transportation projects throughout the United States.6" The relevant section
was an amendment to the bill sponsored by Representative Sam Graves,
a Republican from Missouri, where the car rental company Enterprise
Rent-a-Car is based. 69 The Graves Amendment as enacted is called
"Rented or leased motor vehicle safety and responsibility," and provides
that:
(a) In general.-An owner of a motor vehicle that rents or leases the
vehicle to a person.., shall not be liable under the law of any State
... by reason of being the owner of the vehicle.., for harm to
persons or property that results or arises out of the use, operation,
or possession of the vehicle during the period of the rental or lease,
if(1) the owner.., is engaged in the trade or business of renting
or leasing motor vehicles; and
(2) there is no negligence or criminal wrongdoing on the part of
the owner ....
(b) Financial responsibility laws.-Nothing in this section supersedes
the law of any State...(1) imposing financial responsibility or insurance standards on
the owner of a motor vehicle for the privilege of registering and
operating a motor vehicle; or
(2) imposing liability on business entities engaged in the trade
or business of renting or leasing motor vehicles for failure to meet
the financial responsibility or liability insurance requirements under
State law.7°

67. See, e.g., Michael LaPlaca, What Does the End of Vicarious Liability Mean?, AUTO
RENTAL NEWS, Sept./Oct. 2005, www.fleet-central.com/arn/t_print.cfrn?action=article_pick&
storyID=765.
68. Pub. L. No. 109-59, 119 Stat. 1144 (2005) (codified in U.S. CODE in various sections of
titles 16, 18, 21, 23, 26, 42, 49).
69. Ralph Vartabedian, Who's Liable in Rental Cars?, L.A. TIMES, May 18, 2005, at H1.
70. SAFETEA-LU, 49 U.S.C.A. § 30106 (2005).

UNIVERSITY OFFLORIDA JOURNAL OF LAW & PUBLIC POLICY

[Vol. 18

There were no hearings on the amendment, and the only debate in the
House of Representatives took twenty minutes, immediately preceding the
vote on the amendment.7 ' In his allotted ten minutes, Rep. Graves, who
received substantial political contributions from executives of Enterprise
Rent-A-Car, Vanguard Car Rental, and other car and truck leasing
companies,7" claimed that the purpose of the amendment was "to correct
an inequity in the car and truck renting and leasing industry ... [and to]
lower costs and increase choices for all consumers. '' 73 He argued that
"vicarious liability lawsuits cost consumers nationwide over $100 million
would "level the playing field so that
annually" and that his amendment
74
consumers are protected.,
Rep. Nadler, a Democrat from New York, argued in opposition to the
amendment that fifteen states and the District of Columbia have decided
that innocent victims should have recourse to owners/lessors in exchange
for the privilege those states have given the owners/lessors of leasing cars
to anyone, even those without insurance of their own. 75 He gave as an
example New York City, where many people do not own cars and,
therefore, do not have car insurance.76 He asserted that the amendment
would tell states that permit vicarious liability that Congress knows better
than they do about what is best for their citizens. It would give those states
the undesirable choice of leaving innocent accident victims to pay for their
injuries themselves, or requiring owners/lessors to rent only to insured
customers, which would leave many citizens without access to rental cars
and put a damper on the rental car business.77 To illustrate the harmful
effect of the Graves Amendment, Rep. Nadler also used the example of a
foreigner who rents a car, injures an innocent victim, and then flees the
country.78 He argued that it is reasonable for states to decide that the
burden should be borne by the owner/lessor rather than accident victims,

71. 151 CONG. REC. HI 199-1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005) (instructions by Rep. LaHood, the
Acting Chairman); see also Vartabedian, supranote 69 (noting that there were no hearings on the
Graves Amendment, only a brief debate on the House floor).
72. See Money in Politics Databases,at http://politicalmoneyline.com/cgi-win/x-candpg.
exe?DoFn=HOM006073*2006. For example, forthe six-month period ending Sept. 30,2005, Rep.
Graves received almost half of his contributions (25 of 52) from executives of car or truck leasing
or rental companies for a total of $25,300 (43% of the total receipts for the period). Id.
73. 151 CONG. REC. H 1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9, 2005).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. 151 CONG. REC. atH1200.
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hospitals, or taxpayers, and that there is no "overriding [f]ederal interest
in preempting [s]tate laws on this subject."79
Rep. Conyers, a Democrat from Michigan, described the amendment
as "a special interest sham designed to unfairly and unjustifiably protect
the very profitable car rental and leasing industry and harm innocent
bystanders."8 He cited "the principles of federalism" as dictating "that in
all but the most exceptional cases, tort law should be left to the states. Tort
law has traditionally been handled by the state legislative and court
systems under a framework established by our founders.' 8 Rep. Oberstar,
a Democrat from Minnesota, pointed out that individual car owners are
vicariously liable for the negligence of those they let drive their
cars, so
82
owners who lease or rent their cars should be treated similarly.
The amendment passed 236 to 184 in the House, 83 and the full highway
bill passed overwhelmingly without any further discussion of the Graves
Amendment.84 With the President's signature on the bill, most people have
assumed that SAFETEA-LU preempts state vicarious liability laws
rendering them void; 85 however, a New York State Supreme Court Judge
recently held section 30106 unconstitutional,86 raising important issues
about federalism, the Commerce Clause, and the new makeup of the U.S.
Supreme Court.
IV. A CHALLENGE TO THE GRAVES AMENDMENT (SECTION 30106)

There have been several state cases implicating section 30106 since the
enactment of SAFETEA-LU. In Florida, two cases declared that Florida's
applicable statute fell within the "financial responsibility" exception of
section 30106, and therefore held owners/lessors financially responsible up

79.
80.
81.
82.

Id.
Id.at H1201.
Id.
Id.at H1202.

83.

151 CONG. REC. at H1203.

84. Vartabedian, supranote 69, at HI.
85. See, e.g., Michael Cooper, FederalBill Wipes Out a State Law and Makes It Easierto
Lease Cars,N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 4,2005, at B 1; LaPlaca, supranote 67 (describing vicarious liability
laws as "melted away"); Kenn Peters, Law Eases Auto Leasing-Provision in Federal
TransportationBillEliminates VicariousLiability inN.Y, SYRACUSENEWSPAPERS, Aug. 10, 2005,

at Cl.
86. Graham v. Dunkley, 827 N.Y.S.2d 513, 525 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
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to the Florida limit.87 In Maine, the U.S. District Court held that section

30106 did not preempt Maine law because the action commenced before
the effective date of the federal law; 88 but, in a subsequent Maine case that
also commenced before the effective date, the Superior Court noted that
SAFETEA-LU preempted the Maine statute which had been "designed to
provide additional protection for individuals who are injured by motorists
operating rental vehicles." 9
In Connecticut, a plaintiff filed an action in 2005 against We Rent
Minivans, LLC (We Rent) after she was injured by a vehicle owned by We
Rent.9" The Connecticut Superior Court granted We Rent's motion to
strike the count alleging vicarious liability under the Connecticut statute,
holding that section 30106 preempts the statute.9 Similarly, the U.S.
District Court in Arizona granted U-Haul Truck Rental's motion to dismiss
a negligence claim based on vicarious liability because of section 30106.92
More cases involving section 30106 have been litigated in New York
than anywhere else, which is not a surprise given the large number of car
rentals in New York and its liberal vicarious liability law. All but one of
those cases held that section 30106 preempted New York's vicarious
liability law and barred the plaintiffs' claims against car rental
companies. 93 The one exception is Graham v. Dunkley.94 The opinion was

87. Vanguard Car Rental v. Drouin, No. 06-10083 CIV-Moore, 2006 WL 3032120 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 15, 2006); Poole v. Enter. Leasing Co., No. 05-2005-CA-008150, 2006 WL 1388442 (Fla.
Cir. Ct. Mar. 9, 2006).
88. Piche v. Nugent, No. CIV. 05-82-B-K, 2005 WL 2428156, at *2 (D. Me. Sept. 30,2005).
89. Robbins v. Ranjini, No. CV-04-151, 2006 WL 3708066, at *1 (Me. Super. Nov. 27,
2006) ("designed to provide additional protection for individuals who are injured by motorists
operating rental vehicles").
90. Davis v. llama, No. CV0540070745, 2006 WL 1148702, at *1 (Conn. Super. Ct. Mar.
14, 2006).
91. Id. at *3; see also Moncrease v. Chase Manhattan Auto Fin. Corp., 911 A.2d 315, 317
n. 1 (Conn. App. Ct. 2006) (noting that section 30106 preempts state law and abolishes claims for
vicarious liability against car leasing companies).
92. Milsap v. U-Haul Truck Rental Co., No. CIV 06-0209 PHX RCB, 2006 WL 3797731,
at *14, *17 (D. Ariz. Dec. 20, 2006).
93. Jones v. Bill, 825 N.Y.S.2d 508, 510 (N.Y. App. Div. 2006); Murphy v. Pontillo, 820
N.Y.S.2d 743,744 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006); Infante v. U-Haul Co., 815 N.Y.S.2d 921,921 (N.Y. Sup.
Ct. 2006). In both King v. Car Rentals, Inc., 813 N.Y.S.2d 448 (App. Div. 2006), and Leuchner v.
Cavanaugh, 820 N.Y.S.2d 786 (Sup. Ct. 2006), the issue involved whether the plaintiffs' actions
commenced after the enactment of SAFETEA-LU, and in each case the court held that they did not.
94. Graham v. Dunkley, 827 N.Y.S.2d 513 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006). The New York Supreme
Court in Queens County is still holding conferences on the case. See New York State Unified Court
System Web Site, http://iapps.courts.state.ny.us/webcivil/FCASMain.
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rendered by Judge Thomas V. Polizzi, now retired,95 on the
defendant/lessor's motion to dismiss.96 The facts of the case are routine.
The plaintiff, Sharon Graham, alleged that she was injured by a car leased
and driven by Rayon Dunkley and owned by Nissan Infiniti, LT (NILT).97
NILT moved to dismiss on the grounds that SAFETEA-LU preempts the
New York statute that imposes vicarious liability on car owners. 9' Judge
Polizzi reviewed the cases described above.9 9 He then discussed the history
and purpose of New York's Vehicle and Traffic Law section 388.00
Judge Polizzi noted that the New York Court of Appeals has
acknowledged that section 388 changed the common law to ensure that
victims of motor vehicle negligence will have a financially responsible
party from whom to collect to pay for their injuries.'' He also pointed out
that legislation has been proposed in the New York State Legislature to
limit lessors' liability, but it has never been enacted into law. °2 Finally,
Judge Polizzi noted that section 388 survived a constitutional challenge in
the U.S. Supreme Court with Justice Brandeis writing:
The power of the state to protect itself and its inhabitants is not
limited by the scope of the doctrine of principal and agent.... No
good reason is suggested why, where there is permission to take the
automobile into a state for use upon its highways, personal liability
should not be imposed upon the owner in case of injury inflicted
there by the driver's negligence, regardless of the fact that the
owner is a citizen and resident of another state .... 103
Then Judge Polizzi undertook an examination of the constitutionality
of section 30106, concluding that the section is "an unconstitutional
exercise of congressional authority," and refused to dismiss the plaintiff's
cause of action against NILT. " First, the judge supported the right of his
court to undertake the constitutional review by referring to an 1884 U.S.
Supreme Court opinion.'° 5 Clearly, there is nothing in SAFETEA-LU that

95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.

This was Judge Polizzi's last decision; he retired two days later. Caher, supra note 3, at 1.
Graham, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 513.
Id. at 514.
Id.
Id. at515-16.
Id. at 516-17.
Graham, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 516.
Id. at517.
Id. (citing Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253, 259-60 (1933)).
Id. at 517-25.
The Court held that:
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limits decisions about the constitutionality of its provisions to federal
courts. Nevertheless, Judge Polizzi's initiative in considering the
constitutionality of section 30106 is quite surprising. New York statutory
law holds that "courts should not strike down a statute as unconstitutional
unless such statute clearly violates the Constitution.' ', 6 The commentary
notes that:
[A] statute should not ordinarily be set aside as unconstitutional by
a court of original jurisdiction unless such conclusion is
inescapable. Courts of first instance should not exercise
transcendent power of declaring an act of the Legislature
unconstitutional except in rare cases involving life and liberty, and
where the invalidity of the act is apparent on its face.'0 7
However, the comment goes on to say that "where the consequences may
be severe and damage irreparable, the lower court should not hesitate to
determine the constitutionality of a statute."'0 8 Thus, by even addressing
the constitutional issues, Judge Polizzi reveals his determination that the
enactment of section 30106 was one of those rare cases where the liberty
of New Yorkers (specifically, the liberty to be governed by their own
legislature in an area of law that has traditionally been the province of the
states) was patently at stake, and the potential damage to New York State's
system of justice was severe and irreparable.
Judge Polizzi asserted that because the Tenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution reserves to the states all powers not delegated to the federal
government, the court's job was to determine whether section 30106 is
within the powers delegated to Congress or the powers reserved to the

[a] [s]tate court of original jurisdiction . . . may, consistently with existing
[flederal legislation, determine cases at law or equity, arising under the
constitution or laws of the United States, or involving rights dependent upon such
constitution or laws. Upon the state courts, equally with the courts of the Union,
rests the obligation to guard, enforce and protect every right granted or secured by
the Constitution of the United States, and the laws made in pursuance thereof,
whenever those rights are involved in any suit or proceeding before them.
Id. at 518 (citing Robb v. Connolly, Ill U.S. 624, 637 (1884)).
106. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 150 (McKinney 2006).
107. Id. (Comment); see also In re 1175 Evergreen Ave., 284 N.Y.S. 16, 18 (1935) (holding
that "courts of original jurisdiction, under well-settled principles of law should not declare a statute
unconstitutional unless the violations are plain and patent upon the face of the statute").
108. N.Y. STAT. LAW § 150 (McKinney 2006).
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states. °9 Thus, the ultimate question is whether enacting section 30106 is
authorized by the power given to the Congress in the Commerce Clause."'
Judge Polizzi proceeded to give a brief history of Commerce Clause
jurisprudence."'
V. THE COMMERCE CLAUSE AND FEDERALISM

U.S. Supreme Court construction ofthe breadth of the commerce power
has undergone considerable changes in recent years. Between 1937 and
1976, the Court construed the power very broadly, holding that Congress
can regulate intrastate activities whenever necessary to keep interstate
commerce from being burdened." 2 The practical effect of this
interpretation was to assume the constitutional right to regulate anytime
Congress asserted its commerce power. 113 Then, in 1976, the late (then)
Justice Rehnquist wrote the opinion in National League of Cities v.
Usery," which held that Congress did not have the power under the
Commerce Clause to enforce minimum wage and overtime provisions of
the Fair Labor Standards' 15Act against the states "in areas of traditional
governmental functions.""
A. Usery and Garcia
Nine years later the Court overruled Usery with the late Justice
Blackmun noting in his opinion that it was "unworkable" and "inconsistent
with established principles of federalism ...

to draw the boundaries of

state regulatory immunity in terms of 'traditional governmental
function.""' 6 Justice Blackmun listed Usery's four conditions for state
immunity from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause: first, the
federal statute must attempt to regulate "States as States;" second, the
federal statute must be about "matters that are indisputably 'attributes of
state sovereignty;"' third, the federal statute must require states to act in a
way that does not allow them "'to structure integral operations in areas of

109. Graham, 827 N.Y.S.2d at 519-20.
110. Id. at 520 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8 granting Congress the power "to regulate
Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States and with the Indian Tribes").
111. Id.at 520-21.
112. Id.at 520 (citing NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937)).
113. Id. (citing United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941)).
114. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
115. Id. at 852.
116. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 531 (1985).
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traditional governmental functions;"' and fourth, the federal interest does
not justify state submission." 7 Justice Blackmun rejected the third
requirement as being "unsound in principle and unworkable in practice"
and held that state sovereign interests are better protected through the
political process than by "judicially created limitations on federal
power.""' 8 With that opinion, the commerce power once again was being
interpreted",119to give broad "respect for the reach of congressional
power ....
In dissent, Justice Powell, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
O'Connor, discussed "federal overreaching under the Commerce
Clause"' o and characterized the Court's opinion as an "unprecedented
view that Congress is free under the Commerce Clause to assume a State's
traditional sovereign power... without judicial review of its action.""1 He
discussed various activities such as fire prevention, police protection,
sanitation, and public health that "epitomize the concerns of local,
democratic self-government" and are more ably undertaken by state and
local governments than by Congress. 122 He noted the Framers' recognition
that "the most effective democracy occurs at local levels of government,
where people with firsthand knowledge of local problems have more ready
access to public officials responsible for dealing with them.' 23
Justice O'Connor, in her dissent, asserted that state autonomy must be
weighed as a factor in the balance when deciding how Congress can
constitutionally exercise its powers. 124 She seemingly argued that requiring
merely a rational basis for Congress's regulation of a state activity that
"affects" interstate commerce makes federalism "irrelevant" because the
"set of activities remaining beyond the reach of such a commerce power
'may well be negligible." 25
B. Lopez, Morrison, and Raich
Ten years later, in 1995, when Chief Justice Rehnquist delivered the
opinion of the Court in United States v. Lopez, 126 in which he was joined

117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.

Id. at 537.
Id. at 546, 552
Id. at 557.
Id. at 572 (Powell, J., dissenting).
Garcia,469 U.S. at 575.
Id. at 575-76.
Id. at 576.
Id at 586-88 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 588.
See United v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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by Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas, the "Federalism
Five,"' 27 (Justices Stevens, Breyer, Souter, and Ginsburg dissented) he
initiated a new, and at the time surprising, return to a more conservative
interpretation of Congress's powers under the Commerce Clause.' 28 The
Chief Justice returned to the concept of boundaries, which Justice
Blackmun had disparaged, identifying three kinds of activities that
Congress may regulate: first, "the use of the channels of interstate
commerce;" second, "the instrumentalities of interstate commerce, or
persons or things in interstate commerce;" and third, "activities having a
substantial relation to interstate commerce."' Regarding the last category,
the Chief Justice concluded that the test is "whether the regulated activity
'substantially affects' interstate commerce. '"130
In Lopez, the regulated activity was possession of a firearm in a school
zone pursuant to the Gun-Free School Zones Act of 1990,' an activity
32
clearly unrelated to the first two categories that Congress can regulate.1
Thus, the Court's discussion addressed whether this activity substantially
affects interstate commerce. 133The Court listed examples of such activities
that it upheld as properly regulated by Congress. These activities included
intrastate coal mining, intrastate extortionate credit transactions,
restaurants using out-of-state goods, hotels
hosting out-of-state guests, and
134
consumption of home-grown wheat.

127. David J. Barron, FightingFederalismwith Federalism.If It's Not Just a Battle Between
Federalismand Nationalists, What Is It?, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 2081 (2006). Many writers have
referred to the late Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas
as the Federalism Five because of their 5-4 decisions deferring to state sovereignty. See, e.g., Linda
Greenhouse, Thinking about the Supreme Court After Bush v. Gore, 35 IND. L. REv. 435, 436
(2002); Robert L. Hayman, Jr., NeutralPrincipalsand the ResegregationDecisions, 9 WIDENER
L. SYMP. J. 129, 141 (2002); William H. Prior, Jr., The Demandfor Clarity:Federalism,Statutory
Construction, and the 2000 Term, 32 CuMB. L. REv. 361, 361 (2001-02); Florian Sander,
SubsidiarityInfringements Before the European Court ofJustice: FutileInterference with Politics
or a Substantial Step Towards EU Federalism?, 12 CoLUM. J.EuR. L. 517, 560 (2006).
128. The history and progeny ofLopez has been widely discussed. See Lopez, 514 U.S. at 549;
see also Christina E. Coleman, Note, The Futureof the FederalismRevolution: Gonzales v. Raich
andtheLegacyofthe Rehnquist Court,37 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 803 (2006); Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The
"Conservative" Paths of the Rehnquist Court's Federalism Decisions, 69 U. CHI. L. REv. 429
(2002); Rosalie Berger Levinson, Will the New FederalismBe the Legacy of the Rehnquist Court?,
40 VAL. U. L. REv. 589 (2006).
129. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 558-59.
130. Id. at 559.
131. Id. at551.
132. Id. at 559.
133. Id.
134. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-60.
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The common factor among all these activities was "economic activity
substantially affect[ing] interstate commerce. ...
'35"The Court held that
possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an economic
activity that might... substantially affect and sort of interstate commerce,"
and, therefore, Congress did not have the power to regulate it.' 36 Justice
Kennedy, in his concurrence, noted that the Gun-Free School Zones Act
"forecloses the [s]tates from experimenting and exercising their own
judgment in an area to which [s]tates lay claim by right of history and
expertise, and it does so by regulating an activity beyond the realm of
commerce in the ordinary and usual sense of that term."' 3 7 Justice Thomas,
in his concurrence, objected to the "substantial effects" test because it
gives Congress "a police power over the Nation" allowing unrestricted
regulation under the Commerce Clause.'38 On the other hand, Justice
Souter, in his dissent, observed that the commerce power is plenary, 139 and
"[t]he only question is whether the legislative judgment is within the realm
of reason."' 40
In 2000, the Court continued its contraction of congressional power
under the Commerce Clause in UnitedStatesv. Morrisonwith, once again,
Chief Justice Rehnquist authoring the opinion; Justices O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, and Thomas concurring; and Justices Souter, Stevens, Ginsburg,
and Breyer dissenting."'4 The conclusion in Morrison was that Congress
exceeded its Commerce Clause authority in enacting the Violence against
Women Act of 1994, which created a federal civil cause of action against
42
a person who commits a violent crime based on gender.
In the Court's opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist asserted that "[g]endermotivated crimes of violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic
activity. ' 1 Justice Thomas once again talked about "Congress
appropriating state police powers under the guise of regulating
commerce."'" Justice Souter, in dissent, distinguished Morrison from
Lopez by the large amount of information Congress had gathered that
indicated the effect that violence against women had an interstate

135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.

Id. at 560.
Id.
Id. at 583 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
Id. at 599-600 (Thomas, J., concurring).
Lopez, 514 U.S. at 609 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Id. at 613.
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
Id. at 602.
Id. at 613.
Id. at 627 (Thomas, J., concurring).

COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE GRAVES AMENDMENT

commerce.' 45 Among the data were annual costs in the billions of dollars
caused by domestic violence and sexual assaults, amounts suggesting a
significant amount of commerce and a significant bar to women from full
participation in the national economy.'4 6 Justice Breyer, in his dissent,
mentioned that the amount of information Congress gathered could be
indicative of the congressional power to regulate in an area that was
usually subject to state regulation.'47 He also asserted his preference for the
"traditional rational basis approach" in deciding whether Congress was
acting within its commerce power.'48 The opinions in Morrison seemed to
distinguish clearly between the federalists, who wanted to preserve the
states' police powers especially when economic activity was not patently
at issue, from the dissenters, who favored more expansive congressional
power particularly when Congress had compiled data giving it a rational
basis for its regulation.
In the most recent case in this ten-year set of major Commerce Clause
cases, Gonzales v. Raich,'49 there was a change in the federalism
alignment. In this case, Justices Kennedy and Scalia joined Justices
Stevens, Souter, Ginsburg, and Breyer in the majority holding that
Congress has the power under the Commerce Clause to prohibit the local
cultivation and use of marijuana for medicinal purposes in contravention
of California law.' 50 Justice Stevens's reasoning emphasized that all that
is required to uphold Congress's regulation is a "rational basis" for
concluding that the medicinal use of marijuana in California has a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.' He distinguished Raich from
Lopez and Morrisonby asserting that the activities regulated by the federal
Controlled Substances Act "are quintessentially economic," involving
"'the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities [illegal
drugs in this case]."" 52 The statutes in Lopez (gun-free school zones) and
Morrison(violence against women) did not regulate economic activity.'53
Justice Scalia's concurrence in the judgment depended on different
reasoning. He asserted that the Necessary and Proper Clause 54 allows
Congress to regulate intrastate activities that do not affect interstate
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.

Id. at 628-29 (Souter, J., dissenting).
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 635-36.
Id. at 663 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (which in this case was extensive).
Id.
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005).
Id. at9.
Id. at 22; see also United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 25-26 (citing WEBSTER'S THD NEW INT'LDICTIONARY 720 (1966)).
Id. at 25.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 18.
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commerce whenever it is "necessary to make a regulation of interstate
commerce effective.... " 55 Nevertheless, that does not imply that one can
"'pile inference upon inference' ... in order to establish that noneconomic
activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce.... Congress may
regulate noneconomic intrastate activities only where the failure to do so
'could . . undercut' its regulation of interstate commerce."' 56 He
distinguished Raich from Lopez because regulating guns in a school zone
"was 'not an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity[,]'
whereas, regulating a "fungible commodit[y]" like marijuana in interstate
commerce under the Controlled Substances Act, required regulating
intrastate as well.' 57 Justice O'Connor, joined in her dissent by Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, averred that "[t]his case exemplifies
the role of [s]tates as laboratories. The [s]tates's core police powers have
always included authority... to protect the health, safety, and welfare of
their citizens." '5 8 She also found this case "materially indistinguishable
from Lopez and Morrison.... "159
Since the 2005 Raich decision, the two most important events to
Commerce Clause jurisprudence have been the replacement on the Court
of Chief Justice Roberts for Chief Justice Rehnquist and of Justice Alito
for Justice O'Connor. Past cases have demonstrated very different points
of view among the justices regarding the limitations on Congress's power
to enact legislation under the Commerce Clause. The positions taken by
the two new members of the Court may determine the outcome of future
cases.
C. Clues to Roberts andAlito Positions on Congress's
Commerce Power
As a circuit judge for the D.C. Circuit of the U.S. Court of Appeals,
Chief Justice Roberts dissented from a denial of a rehearing in Rancho
Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 60 which may suggest how the Chief Justice would
view a Commerce Clause challenge to section 30106. In Rancho Viejo, the
U.S. Department of the Interior required a housing developer in San Diego
County, California to comply with provisions of the Endangered Species

155.
156.
157.
158.
159.
160.

Raich, 545 U.S. at 35.
Id. at 36, 38 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561, 567).
Id. at 40-42 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561).
Id. at 42 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Id. at 45.
Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
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Act of 1973 (ESA) 161 to avoid disturbing the habitat of arroyo toads. 162
Instead of complying, the developer challenged the application of the ESA
as unconstitutional because arroyo toads live entirely within California
and, therefore, the regulation
exceeded congressional power under the
63
Commerce Clause. 1
The district court found in favor of the federal government because the
"taking" of this endangered species would have a substantial effect on
interstate commerce. " The D.C. Circuit Court affirmed the decision' 65 and
then denied a rehearing en banc from which (then) Circuit Judge Roberts
dissented. 66 He concluded that the circuit court's holding was
"inconsistent with [the] Supreme Court['s] holdings" in Lopez and
Morrison because it mistakenly considered whether the regulation of the
commercial development constitutes interstate commerce, rather than
whether the incidental taking of arroyo toads that "live [their] entire lives
in California" was interstate commerce. 167 He also suggested that the
approach the circuit court took in this case "'would effectually obliterate
the limiting purpose of the Commerce Clause . . 168 Nevertheless,
though clearly favoring a more restrictive view of Congress's commerce
power, this dissent was brief and rather gentle, concluding that a rehearing
before the full court might provide an "opportunity to consider alternative
grounds for sustaining application of the Act that may be more consistent
with Supreme Court precedent."' 69
On the other hand, a dissent by (then) Judge Alito in a Commerce
Clause case before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit was
very detailed and vigorous. 7 0 The case, UnitedStates v. Rybar,'7' involved
a federally licensed firearms dealer who argued that a federal law,' 72
making it unlawful merely to possess a machine gun, was unconstitutional

161. 16 U.S.C. § 1531 (2000).
162. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, No. CIV.A.1.00CV02798, 2001 WL 1223502, at *1 (D.
D.C. Aug. 20, 2001), aft'd, 323 F.3d 1062 (C.A.D.C. 2003).
163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 323 F.3d 1062 (D.C. Cir. 2003).
166. Rancho Viejo, LLC v. Norton, 334 F.3d 1158, 1160 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (with seven judges
voting for the denial and one judge dissenting).
167. Id. at 1160.
168. Id. (quoting GDF Realty Inv., Ltd. v. Norton, 326 F.3d 622, 634-35 (5th Cir. 2003)).
169. Id.
170. United States v. Rybar, 103 F.3d 273, 286 (3d Cir. 1996).
171. Id.
172. 18 U.S.C. § 922(o)(1) (2002).
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because it exceeded Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause.173
The court rejected the challenge to congressional authority, affirming the
district court decision, and Judge Alito dissented.'74 Judge Alito started his
dissent by inquiring, "Was United States v. Lopez ...a constitutional
freak? Or did it signify that the Commerce Clause still imposes some
meaningful limits on congressional power?"' 7 5 He emphasized that in both
Rybar and Lopez, Congress made no findings to link the regulated
intrastate behavior with interstate commerce. 7 6 He then performed a
detailed analysis of the three categories of legislation ("channels,"
"instrumentalities," and "substantial effects," as described above 77 ) that
are permitted under the Commerce Clause.178 Lopez, Morrison,Raich, and
Rybar all focused on Congress's right to regulate "activities that
substantially affect interstate commerce. 1 79
Judge Alito noted that "if Lopez means anything, it is that Congress's
power under the Commerce Clause must have some limits.' 180 He cited the
Lopez opinion for its assertion that the gun-free school zones statute was
"a criminal statute that... ha[d] nothing to do with commerce. ' ', 81 He
argued that the intrastate machine gun possession regulation in Rybar
similarly was not economic or commercial. 82 He also emphasized the lack
of any "congressional findings [or] ...appreciable empirical proof'
proving that the intrastate possession of machine guns causes so much
that it has the required "substantial effect on interstate
more crime 83
commerce."1
Despite the detailed dissection of Commerce Clause judicial opinions
by many scholars over a long period of time, there is widespread
agreement that future opinions are difficult to predict. 84 Nevertheless,
there are some basic principles that can be applied to a consideration of the
constitutionality of section 30106.

173. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 275.
174. Id. at 285-86.
175. Id. at 286.
176. Id. at 287.
177. Supra text accompanying notes 129-30.
178. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 287-93.
179. Id.at291.
180. Id.
181. Id.
182. Id.
183. Rybar, 103 F.3d at 294.
184. See generally Barron, supra note 127, at 2081; Fallon, supra note 128, at 429; Levinson,
supra note 128, at 589.
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VI. COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND SECTION

30106

The presumptive authority for Congress's enactment of section 30106
is the Commerce Clause, and thus the section regulation must be of either
channels of interstate commerce, instrumentalities of interstate commerce,
or activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Because the
section regulates owners of motor vehicles, who can easily travel between
states, one's first thought might be that the section is regulating channels
or instrumentalities of interstate commerce. However, the section is not
regulating the use of motor vehicles at all. It is regulating the intrastate
liability of one who, by virtue of state permission, is a car owner and is in
the business of renting or leasing cars. As described above, states have
taken many different positions about who should pay when an innocent
victim of driver negligence is injured by a car that is rented or leased." 5
Some have retained the common law of torts, holding that without fault
there is no liability.'86 The result of those decisions is that if the
driver/renter has no insurance and no resources, innocent accident victims
will have to pay for the results of their injuries themselves, or if they have
no resources, taxpayers will have to pay. Other results of those decisions
are higher profits for rental/leasing companies and, perhaps, lower prices
for renting/leasing consumers.
Some states have enacted statutes requiring car owners/lessors to
maintain varying minimum levels of liability insurance.' 87 This statutory
scheme provides some protection for the innocent accident victim;
however, in a "$15,000/$30,000/$5,000" state,' 8 the protection may
represent a mere fraction of the cost of the injury sustained.
A few states have statutes imposing vicarious liability on
owners/lessors. 9 Those states have decided to spread the risk associated
with accidents by car lessees to owners/lessors. Owners can insure against
the accident risks and pass the costs on to their leasing customers.
Alternatively, owners can restructure their financing plans so that they are
selling rather than leasing their cars. Under section 30106, these states can
no longer obtain their goal directly, but may do so indirectly by requiring
a very high level of financial responsibility, or requiring owners/lessors to
rent or lease only to those drivers with their own insurance. That kind of

185.
186.
187.
188.
189.

See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying
See supra text accompanying

notes 13-6 1.
notes 8 & 58-61.
notes 36-45.
note 37.
notes 27-30.
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arrangement would once again raise the cost to consumers. Making value
judgments about how the costs of tort injuries are to be apportioned has
traditionally been left to the states exercising their Tenth Amendment
police powers for the health, safety, and general welfare of their citizens.
Congress did not make any findings or refer to any empirical evidence
that indicate any of these state decisions about vicarious liability
substantially affect interstate commerce.19 The Graves Amendment was
put into SAFETEA-LU-a massive transportation bill with something for
everyone, with no research, no hearings, and almost no discussion.19 ' There
is no data to indicate that New York has fewer people driving cars on
interstate highways because of its vicarious liability law than does Virginia
because it has no vicarious liability law or than does Idaho because it has
a financial responsibility statute. Congress pursued no inquiry about the
effects on interstate commerce in Connecticut changed since it supplanted
its unlimited vicarious liability statute with a financial responsibility
statute in 2003. Congress did not know whether the prices of car rentals
and leases were higher throughout the country because a few states have
vicarious liability laws. Congress passed the Graves Amendment without
information that would indicate a rational reason for its enactment.
It should be noted, however, that in 1999, six years prior to the
enactment of SAFETEA-LU, Senator McCain introduced a bill in the
Senate called the Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act of 1999192 that was
very similar to the Graves Amendment. That bill contained a "Finding"
section that stated:
The Congress finds that the vicarious liability laws, the ultimate
insurer laws, and the common law in a small minority of States(1) impose a disproportionate and undue burden on interstate
commerce by increasing rental rates for motor vehicle rental and
leasing customers throughout the United States; and
(2) pose a significant competitive barrier to entry for smaller
motor vehicle rental and leasing companies attempting to compete
in these markets, in contravention of a fundamental principle 19of3
fairness that there should be no liability in the absence of fault.

190. See supratext accompanying note 71.
191. 151 CONG. REC. H 1199-1200 (daily ed. Mar. 9,2005) (instructions by Rep. LaHood, the
Acting Chairman).
192. Motor Vehicle Rental Fairness Act of 1999, S. 1130, 106th Cong. (1999).
193. Id. § 2.

COMMERCE CLAUSE JURISPRUDENCE AND THE GRAVES AMENDMENT

The House version of that bill, called the Rental Fairness Act of 2000,
contained an even more detailed "Findings and Purposes" section 94 and
the report accompanying the bill contained a "Background and Need for
Legislation" section.195 The explanatory sections were based on a hearing
before the House Committee on Commerce at which a representative of
Premier Car Rental Corporation in Albany, New York testified, as did a
representative of Enterprise Rent-A-Car Corporation, and a representative
of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. 96 The Senate Committee
on Commerce, Science, and Transportation also held a hearing on its
bill.' 97 Although they seemed to rely on little evidence other than the
testimony of industry representatives, the majority of the House Commerce
Committee voting for the 2000 bill concluded that the few existing
vicarious liability statutes'9 8 would keep smaller companies from
competing in those states because they could not afford the insurance, and
that would mean less access and higher prices for consumers throughout
the country.' 99 Thus, although there was no congressional investigation or
reasoning given specifically for the Graves Amendment, there was a prior
history that might indicate a rational connection between congressional
regulation of state vicarious liability schemes and interstate commerce.
There is no evidence, however, that members of Congress considered that
history in voting for the SAFETEA-LU containing the Graves
Amendment.
Despite an absence of a strong link between congressional regulation
of vicarious liability, a traditionally state matter, and interstate commerce,
it is easy to make the case that, if faced with the issue, the Supreme Court
would hold that the section did not violate the Commerce Clause. Of the
Federalism Five of Lopez and Morrison (Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas) only Justice Thomas might reasonably be
counted on to object to the federal intrusion on an area usually left to the
states. Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor are, of course, no longer on the
Court.
In his dissent in Raich, Justice Thomas noted that Congress presented
no evidence for its conclusion that California's permission for medical

194. Rental Fairness Act of 2000, H.R. 1954, 106th Cong. § 2 (as reported by H.R. Comm.
on Commerce July 20, 2000).
195. Rental Fairness Act of 2000, H.R. REP. No. 106-774, pt. 1, at 3 (2000).
196. Id. at 5.
197. Id. at 15.
198. See supra text accompanying note 27 (which at the time numbered eleven, but today
number only three).
199. H.R. REP. No. 106-774, at 4.
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marijuana use would interfere with policing illegal interstate drug traffic,
and concluded that "Congress cannot define the scope of its own power
merely by declaring the necessity of its enactments.""2 ' He suggested that
"Congress's aim is really to exercise police power of the sort reserved to
the States, ...,,201
a statement that could similarly be made about section
30106. Justice Thomas goes even further by refuting the majority's
acceptance of a Commerce Clause interpretation giving Congress the
power to regulate "activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce..." asserting that Congress's authority is to "regulate interstate
commerce..."202 and "not things that affect it,... unless truly 'necessary
and proper' to regulating interstate commerce., 20 3 Justice Thomas'
conclusion in Raich might apply as well to section 30106: "Our federalist
system, properly understood allows . . . States to decide for themselves
how to safeguard the health and welfare of their citizens.
It is less likely that the remaining members of the Federalism Five,
Justices Kennedy and Scalia, would hold section 30106 unconstitutional.
As other commentators have noted, their commitment to federalism as a
general theory, as opposed to federalism as a practical matter for advancing
a generally conservative agenda, is in doubt,2 5 and their most likely test for
congressional Commerce Clause authority is whether the regulation
addresses an economic activity.20 6 Although determining tort liability has
certainly been a "traditional government function" of the states, that Usery
test was overruled in Garcia,and economic activity seems to be the test
that remains.20 7 If there is economic activity, then it will be left to Congress
to decide if that activity has a substantial effect on interstate commerce. On
the other hand, because Congress did not undertake any investigation at all
in connection with the Graves Amendment or even refer to hearings that
had been held years earlier about the effect of vicarious liability on
interstate commerce, it is harder to argue that its restriction is necessary
and proper for the "governance of commerce between States," as Justice
Scalia asserted in Raich.208

200.
201.
202.
203.
204.
205.
206.
207.
529 U.S.
208.

Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 64 (2005).
Id.
Id. at 67.
Id. at 71.
Id. at 74.
See, e.g., Barron, supra note 127, at 2084.
Id. at 2096.
See, e.g., United States, v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549,560 (1995); United States v. Morrison,
598, 613 (2000); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1,17 (2005).
Raich, 545 U.S. at 35.
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There is little doubt that the Graves Amendment was a political
response to heavy lobbying by the car rental and leasing industry, and that
it was enacted by a Congress focused on other provisions in the
SAFETEA-LU legislation and persuaded by industry lobbying.
Nevertheless, the Graves Amendment's provenance does not necessarily
make it unconstitutional.
VII. CONCLUSION: THE FUTURE OF VICARIOUS LIABILITY

States responding to section 30106 do not have to acquiesce to a
balance that favors car owners/lessors over accident victims. Just as a few
states chose to enact vicarious liability statutes, they can now enact
financial responsibility statutes, permitted by section 30106, with high
minimum requirements so that those injured by negligent, impoverished,
uninsured drivers of leased vehicles will have recovery sources. States may
also require all drivers of rented or leased cars to have their own insurance.
That scheme would probably raise prices for consumers and perhaps
eliminate the opportunity to have a car at all for some; but the balancing
of those kinds of interests has always been a function that states have
undertaken in exercising their police power to protect their citizens' safety
and welfare.
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